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Abstract
The traditional economic argument states that compliance with envi-
ronmental policy diverts resources from innovation. In his engaging
paper, Porter (1991) argues counterintuitively that more stringent en-
vironmental policies induce innovations the benefits of which exceed
the costs. We build a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model that
takes account of both arguments by including satisficing and profit-
maximizing managers. Our theoretical results enable us to determine
the validity condition of the strong Porter hypothesis which is consis-
tent with empirical results.
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1 Introduction
Growing concern among citizens around the world has impelled govern-
ments in many countries to move environmental issues higher up their policy
agendas. Environmental policies introducing taxes and standards could prove
important in controlling polluting emissions. The principal goal of such poli-
cies is to improve environmental outcomes and ensure sustainable growth by
increasing the opportunity cost of pollution.
Responding to that challenge, in his engaging paper, Porter (1991, p. 168)
argues that well-designed environmental regulation could increase competi-
tiveness: “Strict environmental regulations do not inevitably hinder compet-
itive advantage against rivals; indeed, they often enhance it.” This argument
has stirred a great deal of interest and enthusiasm among influential policy-
makers. Vice President Gore (1992, p. 342) in his thoughtful book states
that “3M, in its Pollution Prevention Pays program, has reported significant
profit improvement as a direct result of its increased attention to shutting
off all the causes of pollution it could find.” Porter and van der Linde (1995,
p. 98) go further, arguing that “that properly designed environmental stan-
dards can trigger innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the
costs of compying with them” and presenting several case studies supporting
this idea. Even if, as Ambec, Cohen, Elgie, and Lanoie (2013, p. 3) point
out, “Porter was not the first to question mainstream economic views about
the cost of environmental regulation”, his work has inspired research into
what is well known in the literature as the “Porter hypothesis”.1
1See Ambec, Cohen, Elgie, and Lanoie (2013, p. 3) for details.
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Palmer, Oates, and Portney (1995, p. 120) criticize this point of view for
its lack of theoretical background, writing “we do not find Porter and van
der Linde at all convincing concerning the pervasiveness of inefficiencies”. In
using a basic model in which firms can innovate in abatement technology,
these authors show that adding a constraint to the production set of what is
otherwise a profit-maximizing firm can only reduce its profits. They further
argue that “making the model dynamic and/or introducing uncertainty does
not overturn this result”. In addition, these authors emphasize that the
major empirical evidence in support of the argument is just a series of case
studies which cannot establish conclusive proof of the Porter hypothesis.
In order to address the aforementioned criticisms, Jaffe and Palmer (1997)
clarify Porter’s argument and the theoretical concepts related to this hypoth-
esis by introducing three versions of the Porter hypothesis. The “narrow”
version focuses on the outcome but not on the process in arguing that cer-
tain types of environmental regulation are more likely to enhance innovation.
The “weak” version states that environmental regulation may spur innova-
tion without indicating whether such innovation is good or bad for firms in
terms of profitability. The “strong” version of the hypothesis (henceforth
SPH) rejects the profit-maximizing paradigm and states that regulation in-
duces innovation the benefits of which exceed the costs, making regulation
desirable for firms.
From an empirical point of view, we believe that investigating the validity
of the SPH is not only challenging, but also closer to the Porter’s original
hypothesis. Accordingly our focus in this paper is on the SPH.
From overviews of empirical contributions to the SPH (e.g. Bra¨nnlund
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and Lundgren (2009) and Ambec, Cohen, Elgie, and Lanoie (2013) among
others), we can draw an incontrovertible conclusion: their empirical results
are inconclusive. Early studies using U.S. data concluded that stricter en-
vironmental policy reduced productivity. For example, Gollop and Roberts
(1983) seek to quantify the impact of sulphur dioxide emission restrictions
on productivity growth in a sample of 56 electric utilities for the period
1973-1976. Their results show that environmental regulation reduces annual
average productivity growth by 0.59 percentage points.
By contrast, some recent empirical studies find evidence supporting the
SPH. For example, Rassier and Earnhart (2015) seek to identify the relation-
ship between clean water regulations and actual profitability in a sample of
U.S. manufacturing industries. Their results suggest that stricter environ-
mental policy actually increases profitability.
Even if the conflicting evidence might arise from methodological or mea-
surement problems (e.g. Lankoski (2010)), we believe that these results echo
the theoretical debate mentioned above. Since this original dispute, a large
body of research has emerged in the literature focusing on its theoretical
underpinnings. According to Ambec, Cohen, Elgie, and Lanoie (2013), the
exploratory models developed in that literature so far can be roughly cate-
gorized as either (i) models that focus on behavioural arguments; (ii) models
based on market failures (e.g. market power, asymmetric information, and
R&D spillovers); or (iii) models based on organizational failure. Theories
relating to the emerging behavioural economics literature (i) depart from
the assumption of profit-maximization, in line with what Porter and van der
Linde (1995) postulate, by assuming that managers behave in ways not con-
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ducive to profit maximization. More precisely, managers may be risk-averse
(Kennedy (1994)), opposed to costly change (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey
(1999)2 and Ambec and Barla (2007) ), or they may exhibit bounded ratio-
nality (Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagne´ (1998)). Theories within (ii) and (iii)
maintain the assumption of profit-maximization in line with what Palmer,
Oates, and Portney (1995) postulate.
Thus in response to the opacity surrounding empirical contributions as
well as the fundamental disagreement over the theoretical contributions about
the assumption of profit-maximization, this paper is the first attempt to reach
a comprehensive understanding of the validity conditions of the SPH by de-
veloping a unified framework that considers the opposing assumptions of
profit-maximization. For that purpose, in the vein of Aghion, Dewatripont,
and Rey (1999), we build a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model which
we extend to allow for pollution and environmental policy so the SPH can be
examined. The main rationale for this is that their models cover two types of
firms: conservative firms in which managers choose just enough innovation to
avoid bankruptcy; and profit-maximizing firms in which managers’ decisions
regarding innovation are to maximize profits.
Our main finding is that the stringency of the environmental policy affects
both types of firm in opposing directions. Managers of conservative firms,
who fear for their jobs, respond by increasing the size of innovation, which
in turn boosts economic growth and downstream firms’ profits. In contrast,
managers of profit-maximizing firms are constrained to reduce the size of
2In a companion paper, Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1997) focus on policy impact
on the rate at which technological is adopted.
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innovation, which in turn reduces economic growth and downstream firms’
profits. Thus, the validity condition of the SPH depends on the prevalence
of one effect relatively to the other.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the recent theoretical literature on the SPH. Section 3 sets out the basic
model. Section 4 investigates the validity condition of the SPH by focusing
on the effects of a stricter environmental policy on growth, pollution, and
downstream firms’ profits. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
Although the authors do not say in so many words which version they model,3
we survey the theoretical literature on the SPH using an R&D-driven endoge-
nous growth model.4 A very large majority of authors assume that firms
pursue profit maximization in all markets. They include Nakada (2004) who
allows for pollution and environmental policy in a framework a` la Aghion and
Howitt (1992). More precisely, the author builds his explanatory model on
two key assumptions. First, he assumes that the agregate level of pollution
is mainly driven by the level of intermediate inputs. Second, he also assumes
that the government is to levy an environmental tax proportional to the level
of pollution on the final good producer. The author shows the existence of
two opposing effects. First, the “general equilibrium effect”, i.e., the reallo-
cation of labour from the intermediate sector to the R&D sector enhances
innovation. Second, the “profitability effect”, i.e., the loss in the profits of
3Except for Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) and Bianco and Salies (2016, 2017).
4See Ricci (2007a) for a survey.
6
the intermediate sector, reduces innovation. Overall a stricter environmental
policy (in the form of an increase in environmental tax) stimulates innova-
tion, which in turn boosts economic growth and reduces pollution. Although
Nakada (2004) does not focus on the SPH, this version of the Porter hy-
pothesis is confirmed by Bianco and Salies (2016, 2017) in the sense that the
long-term effect of an increase in the tax rate on downstream firms’ profits
is positive.
Hart (2004, 2007) extends the multi-sector model of Aghion and Howitt
(1996) to allow for environmental policy in responding to environmental dam-
age caused by the firms’ production. The author makes two key assumptions.
First, there are two discrete R&D sectors, ordinary and environmentally-
friendly, leading respectively to ordinary and environmentally-friendly in-
novations. This assumption allows the author to consider the direction of
technological change. Second, fixed costs and decreasing returns to scale
in the intermediate sector allow for a truncation of the number of vintages
used. A stricter environmental policy (in the form of a higher sales tax) pro-
motes recent and cleaner vintages, reducing environmental harm and boost-
ing downstream firms’ profits, which in turn spurs R&D firms to conduct
research.
Ricci (2007b) extends Hart’s (2004, 2007) multi-period framework in the
sense that he takes into account flexibility in the technological choice of
R&D firms. In this framework, the effect of an environmental policy (in
the form of a tax on polluting emissions) impacts economic growth through
two opposing effects. First, the “direct input effect”, i.e., the incentive for
R&D firms to design cleaner technologies, which reduces the marginal effect
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of R&D on productivity growth. Second, the “green crowding-out effect”,
i.e., the decrease in profits of older and dirtier vintage producers, which in
turn spurs innovation through the reallocation of labour from the productive
sector to the R&D sector. Although the overall effect of the environmental
policy is a priori ambiguous, by means of simulations, the author shows that
the “direct input effect” dominates the “green crowding-out effect”. Thus,
unlike in Hart (2004, 2007), the SPH is never supported.
Among non-endogenous growth models taking up the SPH, there is Xepa-
padeas and de Zeeuw (1999) who analyse the effect of environmental policy
on capital accumulation. The authors build their explanatory model on two
key assumptions. First they imagine two firms: a domestic firm that is regu-
lated and a foreign firm that is not regulated. This assumption implies firms’
decisions about production affect market prices. Second they assume a vin-
tage composition of the firm’s capital stock, where the newer vintage capital
is more productive than the older vintage capital and pollutes less, too. The
authors show that a stricter environmental policy leads to a reduction in a
firm’s capital stock (“downsizing effect”), which in turn increases the market
price by reducing production. Moreover, the environmental policy increases
average productivity by stimulating the retirement of older vintage capital
(“modernization effect”). Overall the authors show that the “modernization
effect” is insufficient to offset all the costs and thus it improves environmental
performance but entails a negative effect for firms’ profits. Feichtinger, Hartl,
Kort, and Veliov (2005) who extend Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) to al-
low for nonlinear functional forms and technological change, do not validate
the SPH either.
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Mohr (2002) uses a vintage capital framework with positive spillovers in
production. The results obtained by the author are based on two main as-
sumptions. First, he assumes that innovation implies newer, cleaner, and
more productive technology. Second, the author assumes the existence of a
learning effect, i.e., an increase in productivity depending on the collective
experience of using capital goods. In sum, the author shows that an envi-
ronmental policy can raise productivity, which in turn increases output and
reduces pollution.
None of these papers, however, takes the behavioural argument described
above into consideration.
In contrast to this literature, Bianco and Salies (2016, 2017) relax the as-
sumption of profit-maximization regarding managers’ decisions about inno-
vation. The authors develop the Schumpeterian endogenous growth model of
Aghion and Griffith (2005, chap.2)5 with conservative managers only, which
they extend to allow for pollution and environmental policy. Given this as-
sumption, it is possible to demonstrate the SPH. Stricter environmental reg-
ulation (in the form of a higher pollution tax) makes the survival constraint
of intermediate firms tighter; satisficing managers, who fear losing their jobs,
respond by increasing the size of innovation, which in turn raises the quality
of intermediate inputs and reduces pollution as well. Furthermore, a higher
environmental tax increases economic growth and downstream firms’ profits,
thus confirming the SPH.
Finally none of the papers in the existing literature considers both con-
5More precisely, the model presented in section 2.1, page 34-38 which is drawn from
Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999).
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flicting behavioural arguments, i.e. profit-maximizing managers and satisfic-
ing managers when investigating the SPH.
3 The basic model
This section presents a basic model in which the economy is designed to
illustrate the two main effects found in both the empirical and theoretical
literature. In this framework, the economy consists of three agents. First,
producers of the final good hire a set of differentiated intermediate inputs
to produce that final good which is sold in the market at unit price. Sec-
ond, each incumbent firm makes two related decisions: they choose the price
of their good, facing the competitive fringe; and they adopt new technol-
ogy enabling each innovating incumbent firm to produce the leading-edge
intermediate input. Departing from the previous literature, we assume two
types of intermediate firms: conservative firms in which managers’ decisions
regarding the size of innovation are just enough to avoid bankruptcy; and
profit-maximizing firms in which the managers’ objective aligns with the
shareholders’ aims, i.e., to maximize profits. Third, the government, whose
objective is to reduce pollution, levies an environmental tax on the producer
of the final good.
3.1 Production and the environment
At time t,6 one homogenous final good yt serving as the nume´raire of the
economy is produced competitively employing a continuum of inputs (or
6The model is set in discrete time.
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intermediate goods) i ∈ [0, 1]. The production technology of the final good
is:
yt =
∫ 1
0
A1−αi,t x
α
i,tdi, α ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
In this equation, xi,t is the quantity of the input i and Ai,t is its quality.
We assume that only the highest quality version of each input i is used in
the production function of the final good. Improvements in quality of inputs
occur via one channel only: innovation by incumbent firms as we shall detail
later.
We follow Nakada (2004) who assumes that pollution arises from the use
of inputs in the production of the final good. An environmental technology
index z relates the quantities of intermediate goods to pollution. However,
we depart from Nakada (2004)7 by assuming that pollution intensity z is en-
dogenous, i.e., inversely proportional to the productivity parameter: z = 1
Ai,t
.
This assumption allows us to obtain constant pollution over time and hence
a permanent effect of environmental policy on pollution which is consistent
with the Porter hypothesis.8 In order to demonstrate this effect, we start by
defining the structural pollution in each industry i as follows:
Pi,t =
xi,t
Ai,t
. (2)
Equation (2) means that the higher the index, the higher the level of pollution
per unit of input. Environmental policy takes the form of a tax, τi,t. The tax,
which varies directly with polluting emissions Pi,t, is paid by downstream
7Our assumption is in line with Bianco and Salies (2016, 2017).
8See equation (B.3) in Appendix B.
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firms to discourage pollution. As suggested by Porter and van der Linde
(1995, p. 111), government should “regulate as late in the production chain
as practical, which will normally allow more flexibility for innovation there
and in the upstream stage”.
From equation (1), the representative downstream firm’s profit is:
pit(y) =
∫ 1
0
A1−αi,t x
α
i,t −
∫ 1
0
pi,txi,tdi−
∫ 1
0
τi,t
xi,t
Ai,t
di, (3)
where pi,t is the price of the input.
For each input i, the representative downstream firm maximizes (3) with
respect to xi,t, given the technology in equation (1), up to the point where
marginal productivity α
(
xi,t
Ai,t
)α−1
is equal to the tax-inclusive marginal cost
pi,t +
τi,t
Ai,t
. As in Bianco and Salies (2016), we define the quality-adjusted
environmental tax as φt ≡
τi,t
Ai,t
: a similar assumption can be found in the en-
dogenous growth model with pollution and labour as input of Verdier (1995),
who adjusts the tax to wages; see also Nakada (2004) and Bianco (2017).
This assumption means that the environmental tax is heterogenous across
firms, because of their different productivity parameters. In what follows,
we assume that unadjusted tax τi,t rises at the same rate as the productivity
parameter, which implies that the adjusted tax φt does not depend on time.
Thus, we can write φt ≡ φ. Combining all these assumptions, the solution
leads to the following inverse demand:
pi,t = α
(
xi,t
Ai,t
)α−1
− φ. (4)
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3.2 Incumbent firms’ decisions
As in Bianco and Salies (2016, 2017), incumbents make two related decisions:
the selling price which in turn gives the selling quantity (regardless of the
degree to which this amount will degrade the environment) and the size of
innovation.
3.2.1 Intermediate production decisions (for a given technology)
Incumbents produce input from the final good at a unit marginal cost. In-
novation is assumed to be non-drastic9
(
χ <
1+φ(1−α)
α
)
.10 This assumption
implies that the incumbent exerts its market power by charging the limit
price, pi,t = χ, so as to prevent the competitive fringe of firms from entering
their market. In addition to the variable cost of production, they incur a
fixed cost of production equal to: ki,t = κAi,t−1. κ is sufficiently large to
allow for bankruptcy, in which case, managers would lose their jobs. Under
these assumptions, the value for profit net of the fixed cost of production is:
pii,t = [χ− 1] xi,t − κAi,t−1. Then, using the limit price, we obtain partial
equilibrium sales and profits of the monopolist in sector i:
xi,t = δ(φ)Ai,t, (5)
pii,t = (χ− 1)δ(φ)Ai,t − κAi,t−1, (6)
where δ(φ) ≡
(
χ+φ
α
) 1
α−1 is constant over time.
9Notice that Bianco and Salies (2017) extend their model to include drastic innovation
as well.
10Note that the price set by the incumbent would be 1+φ(1−α)
α
, were the fringe to be
ignored.
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It is noteworthy that environmental tax φ reduces partial equilibrium
sales, which in turn decreases the profit net of the fixed cost.
3.2.2 Entrepreneurial behaviours and the adoption of new tech-
nologies
Contrary to the literature mentioned above, i.e., Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw
(1999), Mohr (2002), Nakada (2004), Feichtinger, Hartl, Kort, and Veliov
(2005), Hart (2004, 2007), Ricci (2007b), who focus only on profit-maximizing
managers, and Bianco and Salies (2016, 2017), who focus only on satisfic-
ing managers, we generalize all these models by examining an economy in
which the industry consists of both satisficing and profit-maximizing man-
agers. For the sake of simplicity, we split the intermediate goods sector be-
tween profit-maximizing managers who monopolize intermediate goods mar-
kets (i ∈ [0,m]) and satisficing managers who own the remaining markets
(i ∈ ]m, 1]). In addition, as in Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey (1999), Aghion
and Griffith (2005, chap.2), and Bianco and Salies (2016, 2017), we assume
that incumbents are self-financed. This means that firms have enough initial
endowments to finance their first innovation and then finance the subsequent
innovations out of net profits.
3.2.2.1 Profit-maximizing managers and the size of innovation.
Here we introduce the innovation process by positing a deterministic pro-
cess at the firm level. When an incumbent achieves a technological break-
through, the quality of the input jumps from Am,t−1 to Am,t = γmAm,t−1,
where γm > 1 represents the size of innovation (or the incremental improve-
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ment in quality). Let us denote the sunk cost of adopting the leading-
edge technology by γ
2
m
2
Ai,t−1. The firm’s net profit flow is thus p˜im,t =
(χ − 1)δ(φ)Am,t −
[
κ− γ
2
m
2
]
Am,t−1. Substituting for Am,t using the inno-
vation process, and then maximizing gives us the optimal size of innovation:
γm = (χ− 1)δ(φ). (7)
It is noteworthy that the size of innovation decreases with the environ-
mental tax φ. This means that environmental policy decreases incentive to
innovate for profit-maximizing firms. This result that we henceforth call the
“traditional effect” is in line with the basic argument developed in the litera-
ture which invalidates the Porter hypothesis (see Palmer, Oates, and Portney
(1995), and specially the “profitability effect” developed by Nakada (2004)).
3.2.2.2 Satisficing managers and the size of innovation. Porter and
van der Linde (1995) suggest organizational inertia and lack of control over
managers are among the possible constraints that intermediate firms’ owners
will have to remove to comply with environmental policy. As in Bianco and
Salies (2016, 2017), we define slack as under-exploited managerial resources
to increase innovation, in the sense that managers enjoy private benefits
(net of innovation efforts) greater than the amount required to retain them
within the firm. Let us denote the private benefit a manager denotes from
controlling the intermediate firm by B. And, let B − γc denote this benefit
net of innovation efforts. Managers, who fear losing their jobs, are mainly
concerned with preserving a positive net benefit of control in intermediate
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firms; thus, as long as, B > γc, there is some room to reduce slack.
As in the previous subsection, we assume a deterministic innovation pro-
cess at the firm level, given by: Ac,t = γcAc,t−1, where γc > 1. Thus, the
firm’s net profit flow can be written: p˜ic,t = [(χ− 1)δ(φ)Ac,t − κ]Ac,t−1. Sub-
stituting for Ac,t using the innovation process into the firm’s net profit, and
modelling the decision of satisficing managers on the size of innovation as
described above,11 we get the following solution:
γc =
κ
(χ− 1)δ(φ)
, (8)
which nulifies the firm’s net profit. It is particulary noteworthy that the
size of innovation increases with environmental policy. This means that en-
vironmental policy prompts the satisficing manager to innovate. Except for
Bianco and Salies (2016, 2017), this result henceforth called the “satisficing
effect” is new in the literature on the SPH mentioned above.
In a nutshell, environmental policy in the form of a tax φ has a heteroge-
nous impact on the size of innovation, depending on the manager’s behaviour.
While environmental policy spurs satisficing managers to innovate, this same
policy discourages profit-maximizing managers from innovating. Notice that
this result is consistent with empirical results found in the literature.
11More formally, that decision could be found by solving the classical program:
maxγc {B − γc : p˜ic,t ≥ 0} which leads to zero profit.
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3.3 Growth rate of the economy
In our economy, the economy’s gross domestic product equals the output of
the final good yt minus the amount used in producing each of intermedi-
ate goods. Since each intermediate good is produced from final output at
marginal cost equal to one, we have: GDPt =
∫ 1
0
A1−αi,t x
α
i,tdi−
∫ 1
0
xi,tdi. Sub-
stituting for xi,t using (5), the economy’s gross domestic product becomes:
GDPt =
(
χ+ φ
α
− 1
)
δ(φ)At, (9)
where At ≡
∫ 1
0
Ai,tdi is the average productivity. In line with the Schum-
peterian endogenous growth literature, equation (9) means that innovation
is the only source of growth. Let us break down the average productivity
into two groups in accordance with the manager’s behaviour:
At =
∫ m
0
Am,tdi+
∫ 1
m
Ac,tdi. (10)
From the definition of the growth rate of the economy,
g ≡
GDPt+1 −GDPt
GDPt
, (11)
and then using equations (9), (10),(11), we get:12
g = mγm + (1−m)γc − 1. (12)
12Without loss of generality, we normalize productivity parameters at date t−1 to unity.
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This feature of the model is crucial to our result: environmental policy
in the form of a tax φ has a heterogenous impact on the size of innovation,
depending on the manager’s behaviour, which in turn affects the economic
growth rate in the opposite way. Hence, the overall effect of environmental
policy on the growth rate depends on which effect dominates. If the “sat-
isficing effect” dominates the “traditional effect”, then environmental policy
enhances innovation, otherwise the opposite result occurs.
4 The validity condition of the SPH
Predicting the SPH in our model requires finding that a stricter environ-
mental policy, i.e., a higher φ, reduces pollution (∂Pt
∂φ
< 0), enhances growth
( ∂g
∂φ
> 0), and benefits firms in terms of profits. As in Bianco and Salies (2016,
2017), this latter condition only needs to be verified in the downstream sector
since conservative firm’s profits in the intermediate sector are set equal to
zero by satisficing managers.13 That is why we assume that pollution comes
from the use of inputs. Proposition 1 below states that our model confirms
these conditions.
Proposition 1 If innovation is non-drastic, for m < m˜ sufficiently small,
a stricter environmental policy
(i) enhances growth;
(ii) reduces pollution;
(iii) increases downstream firms’ profits.
Proof. See Appendix B.
13See Appendix A for the consistency with Porter’s argument in terms of firms’ net
profits.
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For simplicity’s sake, we break these impacts up into direct and indi-
rect effects. From equation (3) a higher environmental tax φ increases the
cost of pollution, i.e., φxi,t for all i, which has a direct negative effect on
downstream firms’ profits. These firms respond by reducing their demand
for intermediate goods, which can be seen from equation (5), holding pi,t
constant. This shift in demand implies a fall in output yt but also lower
production costs
(∫ 1
0
pi,txi,tdi
)
and a lower cost of the environmental policy(∫ 1
0
φxi,tdi
)
in the downstream sector, holding Ai,t constant. Although it
also reduces monopoly rents (χ − 1)xi,t of both profit-maximizing and con-
servative incumbent intermediate firms, managers react in exactly the oppo-
site way. In profit-maximizing firms, managers respond by reducing the size
of innovation, which in turn reduces productivity Am,t (“traditional effect”)
while in conservative firms, satificing managers respond by raising the size
of innovation just enough to avoid bankruptcy, which in turn raises produc-
tivity Ac,t (“satisficing effect”). Thus, the effect of a stricter environmental
policy on growth depends only upon which effect dominates. More precisely,
environmental policy sustains growth provided that the “satisficing effect”
dominates the “traditional effect”, i.e., m < m˜. This explains part (i) of
Proposition 1.
Consider the impact of environmental policy on pollution. Combining
our assumption that pollution intensity is inversely proportional to the pro-
ductivity parameter Ai,t with the assumption about constant returns to scale
in the production of the final good entails that the partial equilibrium sales
of the monopolist in sector i is an increasing linear function of Ai,t (see equa-
tion (5)), which in turn involves constant aggregate pollution (see equation
19
(B.2)). Thus a stricter environmental policy decreases the demand for in-
termediate inputs, which in turn decreases aggregate pollution through δ(φ)
(see equation (B.3)). This explains part (ii) of Proposition 1.
Finally, it is obvious that the effect of the environmental policy on the
downstream firms’ profits is ambiguous, either positive or negative, depend-
ing upon the density of profit-maximizing firms, i.e., the parameter m.14
Indeed, through the cost of environmental policy
(
φ
∫ 1
0
xi,tdi
)
, the variable
costs of production
(∫ 1
0
pi,txi,tdi
)
and the output itself yt, the impact of a
stricter environmental policy can be broken up into two main effects, i.e., the
“growth effect” including both “satisficing” and “traditional” effects and the
“direct effect”. While the former through the “satisficing effect” (respectively
the “traditional effect”) increases (respectively decreases) downstream firms’
profits, the latter through the “direct effect”, i.e., F (φ) always decreases the
downstream firms’ profits. As a consequence, a stricter environmental policy
increases downstream firms’ profits provided that the “satisficing effect” off-
sets both “traditional” and “direct” effects, i.e., ˜˜m < m˜. This explains part
(iii) of Proposition 1.
Table 1 below summarizes the various effects described above by using
the density of profit-maximizing firms in the economy, i.e., the parameter m.
This latter allow us to present the validity condition of the SPH. Indeed, this
condition is confirmed provided that the density of profit-maximizing firms is
low enough (m < m˜). In this case, a stricter environmental policy increases
growth as well as dowstream firms’ profits whereas it decreases pollution.
This result is consistent with the empirical literature, for instance, Rassier
14For details, see equation (B.1) in Appendix B.
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and Earnhart (2015) and more recently Cohen and Tubb (2018) who perform
a meta-analysis of 103 publications relating to the Porter hypothesis. In the
other cases, at least one condition of the SPH is invalidated either the effect
on growth is negative for m > m˜ or the effect on downstream firms’ profits
is also negative for m > ˜˜m.
m
Pt
g
pit(y)
0 ˜˜m m˜ 1
− − −
+ + 0 −
+ 0 − −
Table 1: The validity conditions of the SPH.
It is noteworthy that our theoretical results are also consistent with the
weak version of the Porter hypothesis. For in-between density of profit-
maximizing firms, i.e., ˜˜m < m < m˜, a stricter environmental policy still
increases growth whereas it reduces both pollution and downstream firms’
profits. For instance, this results is consistent with the empirical work of Lee,
Veloso, and Hounshell (2011). In addition to these results, our theoretical
results are also consistent with another case in which the Porter hypothesis
is not supported at all. For a large density of profit-maximizing firms in
the economy, i.e., m > m˜, a stricter environmental policy reduces growth,
pollution, and downstream firms’ profits as well. This result is still consistent
with another part of the empirical literature, for instance, Gollop and Roberts
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(1983).
5 Concluding remarks
This paper is the first attempt to reach a comprehensive understanding of the
validity condition of the SPH by developing a unified framework that makes
two opposing assumptions about profit-maximization, i.e. profit-maximizing
and conservative managers. These assumptions enable us to show that man-
agers behaviour can radically affect the impact of environmental policy: with
profit-maximizing managers, a more stringent environmental policy tends to
reduce innovation and thus both growth and profit, whereas with satisficing
managers, both effects are reversed. As a consequence, our theoretical re-
sults predict the SPH that a stricter environmental policy (a higher tax in
our model) improves growth, the environment, and induces profitable innova-
tions provided that the density of profit-maximizing firms does not exceed a
threshold, otherwise the lack of evidence supporting the SPH emerges. How-
ever, even in this case, our theoretical results are also consistent with either
the weak version of the Porter hypothesis, for in-between density of profit-
maximizing firms or the lack of evidence supporting the Porter hypothesis
for a high density of profit-maximizing firms.
The analysis in this paper should nevertheless be extended to a welfare
analysis, given the public nature of the environment and the negative external
effects of pollution on welfare that we have ignored in this paper. This and
other extensions of the analysis in this paper are left for future research.
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A Consistency with Porter’s argument
For the sake of consistency with Porter’s argument, we have to impose a con-
dition whereby the profit-maximizing firms’ net profit must be greater than
the conservative firms’ net profit, whatever the quality-adjusted environmen-
tal tax φ. Given that the satisficing managers’ behaviour leads to a zero net
profit, then the substitution for γm using (7) into the profit-maximizing firm’s
net profit flow gives us the condition of consistency with Porter’s argument:
κ <
[(χ− 1)δ(φ)]2
2
, (A.1)
which is always positive.
B Proof of Proposition 1
(i). A stricter environmental policy enhances growth provided that m < m˜.
Differentiating the growth rate of the economy (12) with respect to φ, gives:
∂g
∂φ
= m
∂γm
∂φ︸︷︷︸
traditional effect
+(1−m)
∂γc
∂φ︸︷︷︸
satisficing effect
. (B.1)
As the traditional effect which is equal to (χ − 1)∂δ(φ)
∂φ
, is negative while
the satisficing effect which is equal to
−κ(χ−1)
∂δ(φ)
∂φ
[(χ−1)δ(φ)]2
is positive, the sign of ∂g
∂φ
is either positive or negative depending upon the value of m. A stricter
environmental policy enhances growth provided that m < 1
1+
[(χ−1)δ(φ)]2
κ
≡ m˜,
otherwise the opposite effect emerges. Notice that 0 < m˜ < 1, which proves
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the co-existence of two opposing effects and thus part (i) of Proposition 1.
(ii). A stricter environmental policy reduces pollution.
Let us first compute aggregate pollution. Substituting for xi,t using (5) into
(2), pollution in sector i is:
Pi,t = δ(φ), (B.2)
which is constant over time and across sector i. Aggregate pollution
∫ 1
0
Pi,tdi,
which we denote by Pt, is thus equal to δ(φ) as well. Differentiating Pt with
respect to φ, we get:
∂Pt
∂τ
=
∂δ(φ)
∂φ
, (B.3)
which is clearly negative (because of ∂δ(φ)
∂φ
< 0) and thus proves part (ii) of
Proposition 1. Notice that this result reflects the one in Bianco and Salies
(2016, 2017) meaning that a stricter environmental policy permanently re-
duces aggregate pollution.
(iii). A stricter environmental policy increases downstream firms’ profits
provided that m < ˜˜m.
Let us first compute the reduced form of downstream firms’ profits. Starting
by substituting for xi,t using (5) into (3) and then using the definition of the
adjusted environmental tax rate, i.e., φ ≡
τi,t
Ai,t
, we obtain:
pit(y) = [(1− α)δ(φ)
α]At, (B.4)
where At ≡
∫ 1
0
Ai,tdi represents the average productivity. Then, substituting
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for At using (10), we get:
pit(y) = [(1− α)δ(φ)
α]
[∫ m
0
Am,tdi+
∫ 1
m
Ac,tdi
]
, (B.5)
which in turn can be rewritten with the help of the innovation process using
Am,t = γmAm,t−1 and Ac,t = γcAc,t−1 and the assumption of normalization
of the productivity parameters at date t − 1, i.e., Am,t−1 = Ac,t−1 = 1, as
follows:
pit(y) = F (φ) [mγm + (1−m)γc] , (B.6)
where F (φ) ≡ (1 − α)δ(φ)α is a decreasing function of the quality-adjusted
environmental tax φ.
Now, differentiating downstream firms’ profits (B.6) with respect to φ,
we get:
∂pit(y)
∂φ
= F (φ)
[
m
∂γm
∂φ
+ (1−m)
∂γc
∂φ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth effect
+
∂F (φ)
∂φ
[mγm + (1−m)γc]︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
. (B.7)
At this stage, the sign of this derivative is ambiguous. Indeed, a stricter
environmental policy, through the growth effect, impacts downstream firms’
profits positively or negatively depending on the parameter m (see part (i)
of Proposition 1). In addition to this ambiguous effect, through the direct
effect, a stricter environmental policy always reduces downstream firms’ prof-
its (because mγm + (1 − m)γc > 0 and
∂F (φ)
∂φ
= αF (φ)
δ(φ)
∂δ(φ)
∂φ
< 0, because of
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∂δ(φ)
∂φ
< 0).
Inserting F (φ) and the derivative of F (φ) with respect to φ in (B.7), we
get:
∂pit(y)
∂φ
=
{
m
[
∂γm
∂φ
+ α
∂δ(φ)
∂φ
1
δ(φ)
γm
]
+ (1−m)
[
∂γc
∂φ
+ α
∂δ(φ)
∂φ
1
δ(φ)
γc
]}
F (φ), (B.8)
then, using the definition of γc and γm and their derivative with respect to
φ simplifies (B.8) as follows:
∂pit(y)
∂φ
=
[
−δ(φ)
α
]
[mγm(1 + α) + (1−m)γc(α− 1)] . (B.9)
Finally, substituting for γc and γm using (7) and (8) into (B.9), we can
demonstrate that (B.9) is positive provided that m < 1
1+ 1+α
1−α
[(χ−1)δ(φ)]2
κ
≡ ˜˜m,
otherwise the opposing effect emerges. This proves part (iii) of Proposition
1. In addition to the sign of the previous derivative, as the denominator is
greater than one, it obvious that ˜˜m < 1 which proves the co-existence of the
two effects described above.
Let us now compare the two values of m. As we assume that 0 < α < 1,
it can easily be shown that 1+α
1−α
> 1, which in turn by comparaison with the
definition of m˜ proves that ˜˜m < m˜. 
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